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This paper presents a framework for how the multifaceted nature of “gender” (human and 
 linguistic) interacts with grammatical operations such as coreference dependency formation. 
It frames the question through the lens of English, in which it focuses on how personal names 
and referents who identify as nonbinary can provide insight into the conceptual  representations 
of gender. Additional data from a variety of modern languages supports a model of how  gender 
might be cognitively represented such that the observed linguistic patterns are available. I 
 propose a three-tiered model of gender that unites grammatical, cognitive, social, and biological 
aspects and describes how implications of this model might be tested in future work.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Preface
The inspiration for this paper comes from the observation that gender agreement can 
sometimes follow different criteria cross-linguistically, and more crucially, in different 
contexts within a language and between individuals. This is not a new observation; this 
paper elaborates on it by examining typological variation and contextual variation to 
propose a system for discussing different types of “gender” that are linguistically encoded 
and how they affect the form that agreement takes. The novel contribution is a framework 
for integrating general and linguistic cognition as related to gender, broadly construed. 
This framework will allow theoretical and experimental work in this area to more clearly 
identify and navigate issues relating to human gender as both a categorical and gradient 
phenomenon.
To begin, I lay out my proposed terminology for discussing gender in a principled way. 
This sets the stage for examining data from English, which does not overtly mark gender 
agreement outside of third person singular pronouns, and comparing it to observations 
from a variety of other languages that have richer gender inflection systems. I also examine 
how some lexical innovations which encode nonbinary gender fit into the wider picture of 
coreference.
Finally, these observations provide the foundation for a proposal which places languages 
(or, potentially individual speakers of those languages) along a gradient of permissive-
ness in gender agreement and relates this to how different types of gender, including 
nonbinary identities, are conceptualized and learned. The intention of this structure is to 
organize formal, empirical, and philosophical evidence to support the claim that gender 
is represented and accessed at different levels and to different degrees during the process 
of coreference resolution.
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1.2 Gender as a complex phenomenon
The term gender is fraught in part because definitions given in the linguistics literature can 
vary dramatically across subfields or even specific works and are sometimes left as tacit 
assumptions, even within contexts like coreference resolution. This paper aims to clarify 
what kinds of gender might be relevant for real-time processing of syntactic agreement 
and coreference between a pronoun and a referring expression, noting proper names and 
genders outside of the ‘masculine-feminine’ (or ‘male-female’) binary. It develops the 
hypothesis that the type of gender involved in coreference checking in English, and pos-
sibly other languages, is primarily a domain-general categorical representation of the ref-
erent which a formal syntactic or semantic feature can draw upon during agreement and 
checking operations. That is, the mechanism for categorization of gender which is used to 
check gender congruency between a pronoun and the expression with which it corefers 
relies fundamentally on a general cognitive mechanism for classifying and checking con-
gruency of gender rather than relying on a mechanism specific to linguistic processing, in 
line with the ‘mental model’ framework (e.g., Garnham & Oakhill 1990; Garrod & Terras 
2000). Finally, I suggest some lines of research into individual variation that would be 
able to inform the questions brought up herein.
I will explicitly and precisely define several types of gender in order to provide consist-
ent and unambiguous terminology to the study of coreference and pronouns. These defini-
tions of “gender” include grammatical gender, conceptual gender, gender identity, gender 
expression, and biosocial gender. I iteratively develop a criterion for checking gender con-
gruency (whether or not two lexical items ‘match’ in gender), then suggest a gradient way 
in which languages might employ the final formulation of the criterion to result in the 
typological variation observed. I also describe a three-tiered schema for formalizing the 
process of gender checking during coreference resolution. While English is the primary 
focus of this paper, I will demonstrate that motivation for these three categories can be 
found cross-linguistically. I draw on biological, social, cognitive, and grammatical evidence 
for how gender is conceptualized and used in human interaction in order to argue that 
coreference resolution (in English) relies primarily on a non-syntactic property, conceptual 
gender, for determining whether or not a pronoun and coreferring expression match or 
mismatch, which is domain-general in origin.
The relative difference in acceptability between sentences (1-a) and (1-b) (indicated 
by a #) illustrates that English coreference is influenced by discourse-level information 
and world knowledge. In order to develop a felicitous context for (1-a), one almost must 
assume the speaker is communicating their disapproval of the referent through misgender-
ing. That is, although the referent’s gender remains ambiguous without further context, 
a salient interpretation would be that the speaker is intentionally discussing the referent 
using gendered words (either pronouns or definitional nouns) that are incongruent with 
the gender identity (defined in Section 2) and wishes of the referent.1 In contrast, (1-b) 
provides a context that immediately allows for a felicitous and not necessarily transphobic 
interpretation since the gender of the costume-wearer and the gender of the pronoun may 
‘mismatch’ without qualifying as misgendering the referent, as the costume is intended to 
mask their gender identity.
(1) a. #At the farmhouse, the cowgirli left hisi lasso in the kitchen.
b. At the Halloween party, the cowgirli left hisi lasso in the kitchen.
 1 ‘Misgendering’, or referring to someone in a way that invalidates and devalues their identity, is known to 
cause mental, emotional and social distress, negatively impacting health and well-being, particularly in 
adolescents (McLemore 2015; K. Johnson et al. 2019).
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The difference in apparent acceptability between these two sentences indicates that the 
property of gender relevant for coreference is, at the very least, more complex than a for-
mal syntactic feature. This observation by itself is not novel (e.g., Joseph 1979; Hess, Foss 
& Carroll 1995; Garnham, Oakhill & Reynolds 2002; Duffy & Keir 2004; Nieuwland & Van 
Berkum 2006; Gygax et al. 2008; Pyykkönen, Hyönä & van Gompel 2010; Collins & Postal 
2012; Frazier et al. 2015). Thus this paper develops a formal treatment of how certain 
“types” of gender can match or mismatch during coreference dependency resolution and 
what this means for the linguistic encoding of gender identity across languages.
One possible model to explain how gender is conceived and applied to linguistic referents 
is described in the following sections. It represents a self-consistent, comprehensive model 
that can be tested empirically. Furthermore, it provides a starting point for interdisciplinary 
research into the many linguistic facets of gender. In particular, I anticipate this approach 
will benefit linguistic work which examines phenomena where an individual’s gender iden-
tity and/or gender expression is relevant, as well as work which makes use of biosocial gen-
der, including phenotype and hormonal profiles. I especially hope to encourage linguists 
who make use of psycholinguistic properties of gendered pronouns in their research to be 
aware of the issues surrounding the various ways in which gender broadly construed and 
cognition may interface.
2 Defining gender
In order to precisely distinguish different types of gender, the following section briefly 
defines the types of gender relevant to this proposal. These types have been derived from 
syntactic, semantic, typological, sociological, anthropological, and neuro-biological work 
on gender. They are not intended to be all-encompassing; rather they are a terminological 
starting point for a coherent and precise discussion across fields and subfields in which 
the word gender may be used for multiple distinct concepts. The following definitions are 
elaborated upon in this section.
Grammatical gender: The formal syntactic and/or semantic feature that is mor-
pho-syntactically defined. (e.g., Ritter 1993; Comrie 1999; Schriefers & Jescheniak 
1999; Harley & Ritter 2002; Kratzer 2009)
Conceptual gender: The gender that is expressed, inferred, and used by a perceiver to 
classify a referent (typically human, but can be extended to anthropomorphized non-
humans). (e.g., Newman 1992; Bussey & Bandura 1999; Gygax et al. 2008; Irmen & 
Kurovskaja 2010; Armann & Bülthoff 2012; Ansara & Hegarty 2013;  McConnell-Ginet 
2015)
Biosocial gender: The gender of a person based on phenotype, socialization, cul-
tural norms, gender expression, and gender identity. These attributes may conspire 
to influence conceptual gender and gender expression, but this is an ongoing debate 
in the field. (e.g., Taylor & J. A. Hall 1982; Waxman 2010; Ansara & Hegarty 2013; 
Eckert 2014)
Gender role: A set of norms conventionalized by society which are associated 
with clothing or appearance, behavior, preferences, and social expectations. 
(e.g., Gabriel et al. 2008; Brutt-Griffler & Kim 2018)
Gender expression: The way a person appears and behaves, as relating to cul-
tural norms for distinct gender roles. This type of gender can feed into others’ 
perception, thus into conceptual gender as well. (e.g., Rubin & Greene 1991; 
Garnham, Oakhill & Reynolds 2002)
Gender identity: The mental state of a person regarding that individual’s as-
sociation with conceptual gender, gender role, gender expression, and biosocial 
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gender. When grammatical gender referring to a person and the gender identity 
of that person mismatch, this is likely to be considered ‘misgendering’. (e.g., 
Ansara & Hegarty 2013; Zimman 2017; K. Johnson et al. 2019)
2.1 Grammatical gender
Grammatical gender comprises formal morphosyntactic features. They are the properties 
of words that allows the formal grammatical process of agreement to be carried out. 
This includes agreement of grammatical gender categories such as masculine, feminine, 
neuter, common, etc.2 These features are properties of the morphemes themselves, and 
may be independent from the real-world biosocial genders associated with the referents. 
However, Corbett (1991) notes that there is a tendency for languages to correlate gram-
matical gender with the gender of the referent, particularly if human. Moreover, Comrie 
(2005) adds that there is a tendency for personification of animals and inanimate objects 
in languages with grammatical gender to correlate with the grammatical gender of the 
noun phrase. This is further supported experimentally by Konishi (1993), who suggests 
that perception of inanimate referents are semantically influenced by grammatical gender 
cross-linguistically. Finally, it may be noted that languages that use different noun classes 
for subdividing humans almost always divide along a male-female category line inde-
pendently of how many other noun classes are present or what other types of nouns are 
included in those two classes. Subdivision of humans across noun classes is a crucial point 
here, as noun classes that use animacy as a distinction will group humans in the animate 
category, independent of human gender. I am not aware of any language that encodes 
more than two human genders grammatically.3 Even languages of people whose culture 
encodes more than two human genders do not seem to encode those genders grammati-
cally, as illustrated in Section 3.3.
In (2), the Dagestani language Tsez places animals in a noun class that is distinct from 
ones that include humans, and Comrie (2005) reports that grammatical gender does not 
change to reflect the gender roles of personified animals. This contrasts with languages 
like English, in which personification or anthropomorphization can result in the use of 
gendered third person pronouns to refer to non-human animals and inanimate objects that 
would otherwise be referred to with it, the inanimate/non-human pronoun. I argue that the 
variation in use of grammatical gender points to a deeper, more complex system of gender 
categorization both grammatically and conceptually. That is, grammatical gender is in 
principle independent from other types of gender but the way it is deployed and the way it 
influences non-grammatical interpretation suggests it is not entirely decoupled.
The extracts in (2) come from a story in which a rooster (definitionally male) and a hen 
(definitionally female) are married, but the rooster has another romantic partner (a frog, 
no specified gender explicitly or grammatically) thus causing strife in the rooster and hen’s 
relationship (Comrie 2005). Although all animals fall into the third noun class (III) in Tsez, 
the words for rooster (mamalay) and hen (onoču) still have defined conceptual or semantic 
genders despite this not being reflected in the grammatical features. That is, the gram-
matical gender of the frog, the hen, and the rooster are all obligatorily noun class III, with 
agreement marked on the verb, which is not used for humans of any gender.
 2 Grammatical gender may include other noun classes as well, although a detailed discussion of noun classes 
is beyond the scope of this paper.
 3 Kirby Conrod, p.c., suggests that examination of how honorifics are encoded, conceptualized, and learned 
may provide insight into how gender categories adapt and change over time. Although this is outside the 
purview of this paper, I suspect that this line of research could potentially be very fruitful. However, it is 
important to note that honorific systems are much more variable cross-linguistically and also seem to be more 
susceptible to change over time than gender systems. Still, this comparison warrants further investigation.
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(2) Tsez:
a. b - oƛix - no łoħr - ā eƛi - n wit’-wiš ƛin
III - appear - pst+cvb frog - erg say - pst+unw wit’wish quot
‘The frog appeared and said “witwish”.’
b. onoč - ā b - egir - xo zew - č’ey mamalay
hen - erg III - send - prs+cvb be - neg+pst+unw rooster
neł - de - r - tow b - ik’i mi yaqʕuł - no ƛin
it- apud - lat - emph III - go.imp you today- and quot
‘The hen wouldn’t let the rooster in, saying, “Go to her4 again today”.’
In (2), the gender roles of the three characters are inferred through cultural norms, e.g., 
marriage, and expectations, e.g., housework and romantic liaisons, rather than solely 
through grammatical gender such as noun class morphology. In the case of łoħro (frog) 
there is no lexical distinction between the males or females of the species. Thus, the 
interpretation that the frog is a female interloper in the birds’ marriage is not linguisti-
cally encoded. Comrie (2005) reports that Tsez speakers uniformly interpret the frog to 
be female and not male, although it would not be ungrammatical for the frog to be male. 
Thus, the interpretation of the frog as female must come from the cultural expectations of 
the speakers rather than from their language.4
Compare rooster and hen in English and Tsez to languages like German (masculine Hahn 
and feminine Henne, respectively) and Russian (masculine petux and feminine kurica, 
respectively), in which the grammatical gender of the words and the real-world sex of the 
animals is congruent. In Russian, the word for frog (ljaguška) happens to be grammatically 
feminine, thus congruent with the anthropomorphic gender role of the frog character. 
However, in German the word for frog (Frosch) is grammatically masculine. Comrie (2005) 
reports that this makes it difficult, potentially bordering on ungrammatical, to use Frosch 
in translation, since the grammatical gender is incongruent with the anthropomorphic 
gender role of the frog character. According to him, the way to translate this story with-
out indicating a homosexual relationship between the rooster and the frog would be to 
change the species of the interloping character to a feminine word like toad (Kröte). This 
suggests that the grammatical gender of a word and the gender role of the character are 
conceptually connected, even though this need not be the case (Konishi 1993; Irmen & 
Kurovskaja 2010). On the other hand, what might be called grammatical gender in English, 
which is restricted almost entirely to third person pronouns, appears to be fully coupled 
to conceptual gender since the pronoun used would determine how the character’s gender 
role is interpreted. This leads us to the question: what role does grammatical gender play in 
English, if any?
It is unclear whether or not grammatical gender plays a role in English syntactic opera-
tions or psycholinguistic processes. It has been argued that English has completely lost 
grammatical gender, based on historical changes and loss of productive gender morphol-
ogy (Baron 1971). Certainly, there is no overt gender agreement between nouns, adjec-
tives and articles. However, Bjorkman’s recent treatment of gender agreement between 
names and pronouns makes a case for a limited grammatical gender system in English, in 
which sentences like (3) display a contrast in acceptability (Bjorkman 2017).
(3) a. That surgeoni operated on three of theiri patients today.
b. ?*Jonathani operated on three of theiri patients today.
 4 Here, her refers to the frog because in translation to English, it would be ambiguous and unnatural.
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Bjorkman observes that sentences like (3-a) are more acceptable than (3-b), even when 
the surgeon is known to all parties, and suggests this is due to names having grammatical 
gender (i.e., a φ-feature) in English, which must then agree with the pronoun, at least for 
some speakers. A reviewer points out that (3-b)’s acceptability is contextually dependent, as 
Johnathan’s gender identity and the interlocutors’ knowledge of this will affect the accept-
ability of the sentence. For instance, however, consider people like anti-bullying activist 
Jeffrey Marsh who is nonbinary and whose pronouns are they/them, but whose forename 
is strongly biased as masculine. In this case, it is unlikely that speakers will have a  lexical 
entry for Jeffrey that doesn’t have a masculine φ-feature, but this does not change that 
 Jeffrey Marsh’s pronouns are they/them and using other pronouns would be misgendering. 
Speakers would then need to have explicitly acquired the knowledge of which pronouns are 
appropriate in order to avoid misgendering a person whose gender identity is not immedi-
ately inferred from culturally specific cues in gender expression and gender role.
Whether or not English makes use of grammatical gender to determine gender congru-
ency between coreferring elements, an argument for φ-features on names must account 
for how gender (conceptual and/or grammatical) is associated with their referents, since 
gender bias of names is wildly variable and mutable, more akin to cultural shifts than lan-
guage change (Barry & Harper 1982; 1993; Van Fleet & Atwater 1997; Lieberson, Dumais 
& Baumann 2000; Hahn & Bentley 2003; Barry & Harper 2014). Thus, for grammatical 
gender to play a role in English, it would need to be the case that names and a limited 
number of nouns have φ-features for gender, but that agreement with a coreferring pro-
noun is optional in cases where the antecedent does not have a φ-feature for gender. To 
this end, I will set aside the status of grammatical gender in English for the time being and 
return to it in Section 4.1.3.
2.2 Conceptual gender
Conceptual gender encompasses a large number of closely related terms currently in use 
in the literature. This includes semantic gender (e.g., Asarina 2009), definitional gender 
(Kreiner, Sturt & Garrod 2008) and notional gender (i.e. natural gender, but see McConnell-
Ginet (2015) for why the term ‘natural’ is inappropriate), which are ways of associating lexi-
cal items with masculine or feminine properties, but without necessarily attributing formal 
features to them.
This may be illustrated by the strong gender biases of many English occupational terms 
(e.g., Garnham, Oakhill & Reynolds 2002; Kennison & Trofe 2003; Duffy & Keir 2004; Gygax 
et al. 2008; Kreiner, Sturt & Garrod 2008). These biases, although in principle mutable, seem 
to hold consistently and for large swathes of the population. This bias underpins the confu-
sion caused by the “riddle” cited in Reynolds, Garnham & Oakhill (2006) (originally from 
Sanford 1985: 311):
A man and his son were away for a trip. They were driving along the highway when 
they had a terrible accident. The man was killed outright but the son was alive, although 
badly injured. The son was rushed to the hospital and was to have an emergency opera-
tion. On entering the operating theatre, the surgeon looked at the boy, and said, “I cant 
do this operation. This boy is my son.” How can this be?
The difficulty of interpreting the surgeon as being either the son’s mother or any other 
parental figure besides the previously mentioned father is reflected in the enduring nature 
of this riddle. In either case, surgeon is demonstrated to have a strong male bias despite 
there being no definitional requirement for surgeons to be men. While gender is not 
overtly morphologically or grammatically marked in English, there is still some sort of 
conceptual bias that can be difficult to override.
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In Russian, conceptual gender and grammatical gender sometimes clash. Asarina (2009; 
2011) observes that doctor (vrach) is in the first noun class (I), which typically includes 
human male nouns, among other things. However, when referring to a doctor who is a 
woman, there are a few strategies that may be employed in different registers.5 See also 
King (2015) for another detailed account of mixed agreement in Russian. This is a par-
ticularly clear case of a clash between grammatical and conceptual gender because there 
are two loci that agreement could target and the different structural positions each target 
a different locus.
The explanation Asarina gives for how Russian can have mixed case agreement is that 
there is a structural representation of the grammatical feature in the syntax (as opposed to 
in the semantic representation). This means that an unpronounced functional projection 
encodes something about conceptual gender. For example, in Russian, there is a functional 
projection in sentences like (4), i.e. <wmn>, and the agreement is triggered by the closest 
class feature in the tree, i.e. noun class II. Thus the adjective agrees with the grammatical 
gender of the noun (masculine/noun class I, because ‘doctor’ is in the first/masculine noun 
class), but the verb agrees with the conceptual gender of the noun phrase (feminine/noun 
class II, because the doctor is a woman).
(4) Mixed agreement in Russian where vrach (m) refers to a woman and possible 
structural representation, adapted from Asarina (2009):
a. Zubn- oj vrach prishl- a.
dental- m doctor(I) came- f
‘The (female) dentist has come.’
b.
prishl-a
came-F
vrach
doctor(I)
zubn-oj
dental-M
wmn(II)
In this representation, it’s argued that ‘dental’ agrees with ‘doctor’ because the masculine 
φ-feature from vrach is the closest target of agreement in the tree, whereas the verb agrees 
with the (unpronounced) functional head <wmn> as it is the closer target of agreement. 
This requires the functional head be tied to the discourse context, thus is more flexible and 
potentially more defeasible than if such a functional head were absent or unavailable in 
the language. In fact, this type of functional head only seems to be available for human ref-
erents and not animals, even when the animals are anthropomorphic (Comrie 2005). This 
suggests that there is some super-level of categorization in Russian that distinguishes ani-
mals and humans even in contexts where animals are filling human-like gender roles. I will 
set aside the question of distinguishing animals and humans grammatically, but I will also 
suggest that the categories could be cognitively structured in a manner similar to gender.
On the other hand, this is not also the case in formal registers of European French.6 In 
(5), the form of the noun (masculine) does not change to match the gender of the referent, 
although this is at least partly for orthographic reasons.
 5 While Asarina does not address how nonbinary conceptual gender could be encoded in Russian, this is an 
issue which is being explored by nonbinary users of Russian (Wilson 2018).
 6 Speakers of Canadian French report the best solution is to use the feminine word mairesse. This is purport-
edly unavailable in formal registers of European French, as it means the wife of the mayor rather than the 
mayor herself. This is also attested as an older definition in Québécois French (Office québécois de la langue 
française 2017).
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(5) Mixed agreement in French where mayor (m) refers to a woman and possible 
structural representation
a. la maire intelligente
det.fem mayor.masc intelligent.fem
‘The intelligent mayor’
DP
D’
NP
N’
AdjP
intelligente
N’
N
maire
D
la
b. la maire intelligente est vieille
det.fem mayor.masc intelligent.fem is old.fem
‘The intelligent (female) mayor is old.’
TP
T’
VP
V’
AdjP
vieille
V
est
T
DP
D’
NP
N’
AdjP
intelligente
N’
N
maire
D
la
In formal European French the form of the noun does not change. All gender agreement 
must match either the grammatical gender of the head noun or the conceptual gender of 
the referent. Thus, any mixed agreement should only occur when the conceptual gender 
of the referent mismatches the grammatical gender of the head noun. In this case, the 
<wmn> features Asarina proposed would be located above N but below any of its pro-
jections, which is prima facie counter-evidence for a syntactic head that governs gender 
agreement in French.
Responses by Francophone colleagues to my informal queries indicate that mixed agree-
ment in formal French is marginal in some speakers, since there is often an alternative 
form of the noun that would match the conceptual gender of the referent. Thus, further 
investigation into the nuances of mixed agreement in French is warranted. Further inves-
tigation into agreement with nonbinary conceptual gender will also become a viable line 
of research, as users of French (much like Russian) are in the early stages of developing 
gender-neutral or nonbinary grammatical solutions to conceptual gender (Shroy 2016).
Returning to sentence (1) for instance, cowgirl is definitionally female, but can be used 
for a male/masculine referent in certain circumstances. The feminine definition associated 
with cowgirl is thus defeasible, since gender agreement between cowgirl and his should 
be impossible if the property being checked is a morpho-syntactically defined φ-feature. 
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This is not incompatible with English having formal gender features for some words, but 
I argue that it is strong evidence that what is primarily relevant for coreference resolution 
is not the morphosyntactic feature. This argument will be elaborated upon in Section 4.1, 
below.
Furthermore, there is evidence from developmental psychology and language acquisition 
that young children acquire labels for gender categories before they are able to consist-
ently sort people into those categories (Fagot & Leinbach 1993; Welch-Ross & Schmidt 
1996; Bussey & Bandura 1999; O’Brien et al. 2000; Zosuls et al. 2009; Waxman 2010; 
 Fausto-Sterling 2012). At this point in development, (at least) two gender categories are 
present but not enough input has been received to develop a consistent rubric for evaluat-
ing the massive variation present in the population. For instance, children may be able to 
use the proper pronouns for common and canonically gendered referents (e.g., “ mommies” 
and “daddies”) but fail to generalize identification criteria to novel referents that deviate in 
one or more ways (e.g., men with long hair, women wearing collared shirts) (Taylor & J. A. 
Hall 1982; Fagot & Leinbach 1993; Armann & Bülthoff 2012; Ansara & Hegarty 2013). This 
may indicate that gender categories are developed and refined by repeated exposure to 
exemplars and top-down societal reinforcement. The acquisition of gender category labels 
could conceivably support the acquisition of the conceptual categories. I am unaware of 
any cross-linguistic differences in age of acquisition of gender categories, but should such 
differences exist, this would support my claim that linguistic labels feed into non-linguistic 
categorization behaviors.
2.3 Biosocial gender
Biosocial gender is, fundamentally, an individual’s gender as it is experienced internally. In 
addressing this type of gender, a few terminological clarifications are necessary. I will assert 
a distinction between sex and gender, which are widely confounded terms in linguistics and 
psychology (Cheshire 2002; Ansara & Hegarty 2013). Herein, sex refers to biological prop-
erties such as karyotype (XX, XY, etc.) and phenotype (e.g., internal and external anatomy, 
circulating hormonal milieu). Even in biological terms, sex is not a binary property since 
the physical traits contributing to an organism’s sex can vary along multiple dimensions. 
See Fausto-Sterling (2019) for a recent review. As an example of an edge case, people with 
Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (CAIS) may have XY chromosomes but a pre-
dominantly female phenotype (e.g., Hughes et al. 2012). However, sex is still often used 
as a shorthand for distinguishing the bimodal nature of the male-female spectrum (Lorber 
1996; J. L. Johnson & Repta 2012).
This definition of sex overlaps with biosocial gender. More precisely, biosocial gender 
is the multidimensional property of an individual as determined by their biology and cul-
tural norms of identity expression. What distinguishes biosocial gender from other types 
of gender is that, as an external observer, one’s accuracy of categorization is impossible to 
assess without input from the individual’s introspection and medical history. That is, bioso-
cial gender may not be something that can be doubtlessly determined without detailed 
anthropological, introspective and potentially invasive medical analyses. This is because 
social pressures and societal norms can contribute to an individual representing themself 
in a way that is inconsistent with the way they categorize themself ( Fausto-Sterling 2012; 
Ansara & Hegarty 2013; Zimman 2017). One clear illustration is the case of transgender 
people who are “in the closet” or otherwise representing themselves as the binary gender 
category to which they were assigned at birth, despite not identifying as this gender. Here, 
an individual’s biosocial gender might be in direct conflict with the gender with which 
other people would categorize them, that is, the conceptual gender other people attribute 
to them.
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Our current census data suggests that the majority of people have a gender identity that 
fall into a bimodal distribution of biosocial genders (0.4% of respondents in a UK survey 
reported thinking of themselves as a way other than ‘male’ or ‘female’; Glen & Hurrell 
2012). But many individuals do not categorize themselves with a discrete binary label, 
and it would do the science and the individuals a disservice to gloss over the often subtle 
and diverse variations in gender identity present in the population at large, even within 
male and female categories (J. L. Johnson & Repta 2012). Despite the potential complica-
tions in identifying the precise biosocial gender of an individual, it is still an important 
factor for phenomena involving social identity and certain physiology relevant to lin-
guistic processes such as auditory brainstem responses (Liu et al. 2017). One’s biosocial 
gender can affect mental, emotional, and social well-being outcomes, indexical properties 
of speech, and perception of in-group versus out-group (Rubin & Greene 1991; Zimman 
2017; K. Johnson et al. 2019). Therefore, it is important to explicitly define biosocial gen-
der as distinct to ensure it is not confounded during investigation of phenomena associ-
ated with either grammatical or conceptual genders.
3 Further evidence for distinguishing gender types
3.1 Personal names as antecedents
Personal names comprise a large portion of antecedents used in empirical investigations 
and syntactic judgments of English coreference, presumably due to their intuitive gender-
specificity, although this has been identified as an issue in stimulus design (Kasof 1993; 
Merritt & Kok 1995; Van Fleet & Atwater 1997; Lieberson, Dumais & Baumann 2000; 
Gabriel et al. 2008). However, English lacks overt morphological marking on names to 
unambiguously distinguish a correct assessment of the gender identity of the referent, 
where a ‘correct assessment’ would result in a conceptual gender that is congruent with 
the referent’s gender identity. A clear example of this problem is illustrated in (6-a), in 
which the two given pronouns can corefer with the name equally well in the absence 
of disambiguating context (such as whether the Taylor in question is Taylor Swift, a 
woman, or Taylor Lautner, a man. As for Taylor Mason, a nonbinary character played 
by the nonbinary actor Asia Kate Dillon, (6-b) is the appropriate construction (Dillon 
2017), although the processing cost and intuitive acceptability of this linguistic structure, 
in terms of linguistic judgments, is currently a subject of investigation and may vary in 
reported ‘acceptability’ (Konnelly & Cowper 2017; Ackerman 2018; Conrod 2018; Prasad, 
Morris & Feinstein 2018).
(6) a. On the red carpet, Taylori’s fans screamed to get [hisi/heri] attention.
b. On the red carpet, Taylori’s fans screamed to get [theiri] attention.
One possibility is that the name Taylor is stored in the lexicon as discrete entries (e.g., 
Taylor<masc>, Taylor<fem>). The possibility of the lexicon containing Taylor<nonbinary> is a 
logical possibility but cannot be discussed in much more detail at this point without 
introducing speculation because of the current dearth of empirical studies on nonbinary 
gender perception and its influence on lexical categories. If we consider the two binary 
grammatical genders, a comprehender may retrieve one of the two entries initially, but 
have to revise the selection if conflicting information is received at a later time during 
comprehension. The presence of different lexical entries for each string-identical name, 
each with a distinct valuation of a gender φ-feature, makes testable predictions regarding 
the learning and application of new lexical entries. One can quickly learn a new name or 
a new use of a common name, but if extensive previous experience with a common name 
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(e.g., Michael<masc>) influences the processing of a newly encountered and rare version 
of the name (Michael<fem>), this might be observable in behavioral or psychophysical 
measures. If this is the case, it would need to be determined how names most often used 
by nonbinary people are stored in the lexicon, and if these entries are associated with a 
specifically nonbinary feature or another configuration of grammatical gender. If names 
are stored generically with some gender label determined by stereotypicality or statistical 
probability, then by familiarizing a naïve participant to an uncommon or novel pairing 
between a name and gender (e.g., a woman named Michael or a boy named Sue), there 
should still be a detectable processing cost to forming a coreference dependency between 
the pronoun and name. However, if names instead receive gendered properties from 
domain-general or world knowledge, then retrieval of the uncommon entry should be 
facilitated more by the context and less processing cost should be observed (Pyykkönen, 
Hyönä & van Gompel 2010). See Cai et al. (2017) for examples of how long- and short-
term learning can be tested.
Another possibility is that “unisex” or names which are not strongly associated with a par-
ticular gender category are morpho-syntactically underspecified for gender (e.g., Taylor<0>), 
and whatever gender assumptions are made about the referent are done so without refer-
ence to the lexicon or morphosyntactic features. However, it is not immediately clear what 
the implications of this configuration would be or how this could be tested. At the very 
least, it would be necessary to conduct extensive evaluation of each individual participant’s 
experience with the target names and gender nonconformity and examine effects from the 
perspective individual differences (Barry & Harper 1982; 1993; Van Fleet & Atwater 1997; 
Lieberson, Dumais & Baumann 2000; Barry & Harper 2014).
3.2 English as a leader of change
More than just a language of convenience, English has certain properties that allow dis-
sociation of the three proposed types of gender. English marks gender (broadly construed) 
on its third person pronouns (she, he), but it does not have consistently overt or productive 
morphological agreement for gender. Numerous studies demonstrate strong gender biases 
of certain noun phrases (e.g., surgeon, pilot, nurse, babysitter), but these are defeasible 
which indicates the biases are tied to conceptual gender rather than grammatical gender 
(Garnham, Oakhill & Reynolds 2002; Kennison & Trofe 2003; Duffy & Keir 2004; Kreiner, 
Sturt & Garrod 2008; Pyykkönen, Hyönä & van Gompel 2010). Furthermore, English has 
some remnants of gendered morphology (actor/actress, aviator/aviatrix) and definition-
ally gendered nouns (mother, father, cowgirl, bellboy). It is conceivable that the morpho-
logically gender-marked words do have grammatical gender. At least those marked as 
<fem> are the most likely to have retained grammatical gender in English, as those are 
distinctly non-default and definitional. As for the definitionally gendered words, I have 
already demonstrated that it is possible to find contexts where the gender is defeasible. 
This suggests that these words are not grammatically gendered, or at least the relevant 
type of gender is conceptual gender and not grammatical gender.
Finally, in cultural terms, English has been at the international forefront of informal, com-
munity-based development of nonbinary language and so-called “neopronouns”. Examples of 
neopronouns include Spivak pronouns introduced by Spivak (1990: xv) and gender variant 
neologisms described in Centauri (2013), Hord (2016) and Bradley et al. (2019), among oth-
ers. The combination of linguistic innovation, on-going sociological research, and prominence 
of media exposure makes the English language uniquely situated (in the present moment) 
to development and linguistic change regarding gender categories inclusive of nonbinary 
gender(s) and gender neutrality (Page 2013; Brutt-Griffler & Kim 2018).
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3.3 Other gender paradigms
Many cultures around the world have established and traditional nonbinary, queer, and 
third-gender categories. Navajo people called nádleehí are traditionally characterized as 
participating in gendered behaviors of the “opposite sex” (Epple 1998). However, the 
Western concepts of being ‘transgender’, ‘queer’, or ‘homosexual’ do not quite capture the 
Navajo cultural concept. To this end, the terms ‘alternate gender’ and ‘two spirit’ have 
been used to describe nádleehí. While these cultural concepts seem to provide potential 
for investigating concepts of gender categories and language, the Navajo language does 
not mark grammatical gender on human pronouns. Furthermore, the strategy for speaking 
about nádleehí in English is to use standard binary pronouns in a similar manner to how 
binary trans men and trans women use English pronouns, and “not neuter pronouns or 
pronouns specific to nádleehí” (Epple 1998: 279).
This seems to be very similar to how Māori culture and language encodes gender outside 
of the binary (Murray 2003). The terms whakawāhine and whakatāne are “terms which 
translate roughly to ‘becoming’ or ‘making’ woman or man, indicating a transcendent or 
permeable gendered identification” (Murray 2003: 240). However, as in Navajo, Māori 
grammatical gender does not distinguish conceptual gender on pronouns.
The hijras of India are similarly difficult to quantify in Western terms, considering them-
selves to be “‘deficiently’ masculine and ‘incompletely’ feminine” (K. Hall & O’Donovan 
1996: 229). Linguistically, they use the grammatical (and conceptual) gender system of 
Hindi to express their relationship to their gender identities and their affiliation to the com-
munity with a mix of grammatical gender and fluid interaction with binary gender roles.
In Buginese, a language spoken on Sulawesi, Indonesia, by approximately five million 
people, there are distinct lexical items for each of the five recognized genders, but gender 
is not otherwise encoded grammatically (Graham 2004). The five genders can roughly be 
translated into Western concepts as feminine woman (makkunrai), masculine man (oroani), 
feminine man (calabai’), masculine woman (calalai’), and nonbinary (bissu).7 Importantly, 
people who identify as calalai’ and calabai’ do not wish to conform to feminine or mascu-
line standards for the makkunrai or oroani, respectively, but rather have their own stand-
ards for gender expression. Furthermore, people who identify as bissu are considered to 
have both masculine and feminine elements in their souls and thus serve spiritual roles in 
the community (Graham 2004). Much like in Navajo and Māori languages, Buginese does 
not distinguish pronouns for these five conceptual gender categories.
Generally, pronouns are more likely to mark animacy as a φ-feature in these example 
languages. When a language does mark grammatical gender, nonbinary gender categories 
can be indicated through shifting use of standard binary gender agreement (e.g., K. Hall 
& O’Donovan 1996). Investigation of gender perception, category acquisition, and devel-
opment in other cultural paradigms will bring crucial supplementary information to our 
understanding of how different types of gender are mentally represented and how they 
influence each other during linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive behaviors.
4 Gender in coreference resolution
Coreference resolution is said to compare the grammatical features of the pronominal ele-
ment and its candidate antecedent in cases where the parser checks for coreference ( Garnham 
& Oakhill 1990; Garnham, Oakhill & Reynolds 2002). Thus, there must be criteria for what 
counts as ‘matching’ or ‘mismatching’ in order for a coreference dependency to be resolved 
 7 I have taken the liberty of adapting these rough translations away from including terminology such as “female-
bodied man” or “masculine female” as these terms can carry negative connotations in English and are more 
likely to describe gender expressions rather than gender identities.
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or rejected. In a case such as (1), restated below in (7), where coreference is resolvable but 
is not a priori congruent, one might expect the apparent mismatch in gender between cowgirl 
and his to create a processing slowdown in contexts that do not include clues or information 
about the referents ahead of time.
(7) a. #At the farmhouse, the cowgirli left hisi lasso in the kitchen.
b. At the Halloween party, the cowgirli left hisi lasso in the kitchen.
In (7-a), without knowledge of the context, the conceptual gender of the cowgirl and his mis-
match until a suitable alternative context is imagined. In (7-b), the context of a  Halloween 
party (in which gender roles, expression, and possibly even conceptual categories are 
expected to be challenged) easily provides the alternative context. The difference, there-
fore, between (7-a) and (7-b) in terms of acceptability comes from the readers’ ability to 
find a suitable situation in which the conceptual genders match. However, the underlying 
mechanism for such a prediction is not transparently derivable from syntax-first models 
of real-time coreference resolution without incorporation of discourse-level knowledge. In 
what follows, I will set out and incrementally refine a criterion used to evaluate gender 
congruency in coreference resolution. A strict criterion for matching might look some-
thing like this, loosely adapted from definitions of agreement by, e.g., Lasnik & Uriagereka 
(1988); Payne & Huddleston (2002); Carnie (2007):
Strict matching criterion: Matching gender requires the formal grammatical fea-
ture (φ-feature) of the pronoun to be identical to the candidate antecedent. If the 
features are not identical, the coreference dependency is rejected.
This strict version of a matching criterion can be rejected immediately because it is insuf-
ficient to account for some common, well-described types of coreference. Looking briefly 
at (7-b), cowgirl must either have no φ-feature for gender or the φ-feature is <fem>, 
both of which necessarily mismatch with him<masc>. Another example of how the strict 
matching criterion fails is when the antecedent is not explicitly or overtly present in the 
syntax, e.g., the ‘statue rule’ (Jackendoff 1992) and “impostors” which are superficially 
3rd person but conceptually 2nd or 1st (Collins & Postal 2012), thus the φ-features do not 
directly match:
(8) a. Regarding a customer (Jackendoff 1992):
[The ham sandwich in the corner]i needs hisi bill.
b. Spoken to a king (Collins & Postal 2012):
[Your majesty]i must protect yourselfi/himselfi/*herselfi/*themselvesi.
Even still, in these cases of apparent feature mismatch, some formal level of represen-
tation could contain formal features that can be checked during coreference resolu-
tion, i.e. what Collins & Postal (2012) term a ‘source’. These formal features could be 
located in either (or both) the semantic and syntactic representations, but the strict 
definition can only account for the apparent gender mismatch in (7) if we posit that a 
masculine φ-feature is attributed to cowgirl only after it is identified as the candidate 
antecedent of his. In order to account for more data, a slightly less strict criterion 
might be formulated as such, adapted for coreference processing from Collins & Postal 
(2012: 182):8
 8 I have taken liberties in adapting this condition in order to present it in a relatively theory-agnostic  manner.
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Less strict matching criterion: The act of resolving a coreference dependency 
requires an identity relation between the φ-features of a pronoun and either (a) 
φ-features of the antecedent, or (b) φ-features of the antecedent as determined by 
the semantic properties of the notional ‘source’. If the features are not identical, 
the coreference is rejected.
One reviewer noted that this less strict criterion might account for sentences like in (9-a), 
where the source of person<0> could be woman<fem>. If so, it is fairly acceptable due to 
the reduction in ambiguity from the antecedent to its source (Foraker & McElree 2007). 
Compare this to (9-b), in which woman<fem> could have a source of person<0>, creating 
a noticeable reduction in acceptability, presumably because woman is a proper subset of 
person and thus increases ambiguity unnecessarily.9
(9) a. One personi said shei lost heri sunglasses.
b. ?One womani said theyi lost theiri sunglasses.
Yet, this next formulation still might not quite cover the case of (7), where the conceptual 
gender of the antecedent cowgirl is female but the coreference between the masculine pro-
noun and the (female) antecedent is licit. That is, unless the sources is “man<masc> [dressed 
as a cowgirl<fem>]”, the source could easily also be “rancher<0>” or “party-goer<0>”, which 
cannot match as they do not have the <masc> feature, which would form an identity 
relationship with his<masc>. Neither does this less strict criterion fully explain (8), in which 
the antecedents might or might not be interchangeable with sources that have matching 
gender φ-features (a:  “The man<masc>”,  “The customer<0>”; b:  “The king<masc>”,  
“The monarch<0>”). This might be accounted for in two ways. First, there might be a way 
to override the feature checking criteria through modeling the parser as having earlier 
access to pragmatics and world knowledge (consistent with Sigurðsson 2018), or second, 
the feature checking process has a broader criterion of what can count as matching. The 
latter could be formulated as such:
Broad matching criterion: Matching gender requires at least one level of the men-
tal representation of gender to be identical to the candidate antecedent in order to 
match. A conceptual property might include a probabilistic representation of the 
semantic set of possible referents, but also would be susceptible to environmental 
context, e.g., pragmatics, world knowledge, or discourse context (Cai et al. 2017; 
Arnold et al. 2018).
 9 Another interesting point this reviewer notes is that coreference between pronouns seems to require much 
stricter feature matching than between a pronoun and a referring expression, at least in English, as illus-
trated in (i).
(i) a. One personi said shei lost heri sunglasses.
b. One personi said theyi lost theiri sunglasses.
c. *One personi said theyi lost heri sunglasses.
d. *One personi said shei lost theiri sunglasses.
  Since (i-a) and (i-b) are considered acceptable, we can infer that both she and they can corefer with one person. 
However, mixing she and they within one sentence and thus one set of coreferring elements causes a notice-
able reduction in acceptability. This cannot be due to a mismatch in gender between each of the pronouns 
and one person, as (i-a) and (i-b) demonstrate these are individually acceptable. Therefore, it seems likely that 
it is coreference between the pronouns that is unacceptable. In this case, I propose that English (or at least the 
English that is informing these judgments) employs a Strict matching strategy as defined in (11) to evaluate 
coreference between pronouns, but not between a pronoun and a referring expression.
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This final formulation can account for (7) as it directly references the conceptual 
gender of the referents. In can also account for some of the cross-linguistic variation 
observed in the literature (e.g., Comrie 2005). While one of the stricter formulations 
would be sufficient to account for data in some languages, the broad criterion allows 
for language-specific variation in strategy for checking gender matching, which can 
address language-internal variation and hypothetical change over time. This makes it 
both powerful and testable, as it still requires a parameter setting or a clearly defined 
discourse context and theory of gender categories. Languages with very strong or strict 
matching criteria would then find it difficult to have pragmatic context override the 
formal gender features of the pronoun (e.g., anaphor, cataphor) which triggered the 
coreference dependency.
However, all of this assumes that languages that have formal gender features on pro-
nominal elements also have formal features that can be checked on the candidate ante-
cedents. What then, would happen if the candidate antecedent didn’t have a φ-feature 
in any instantiation? Would this cause a processing slowdown because the initial check-
ing operation would automatically fail? If so, we should expect to see processing slow-
downs for coreference dependencies which connect gender- unbiased or undefined 
antecedents and gender-specific pronouns as compared to coreference dependencies 
which connect gender-specific antecedents to gender-specific pronouns (cf. Foertsch & 
Gernsbacher 1997).
With this ‘broad’ matching criterion, I have shifted the formal problem of typological 
variation from the process of checking for gender congruency to the type of gender that is 
checked. This is addressed by the three-tier model illustrated in Figure 1, which provides 
a formal structure that languages and individuals can use to determine gender congruency 
all using the same standardized criterion.
4.1 Checking for congruency
If formal morphosyntactic gender features are present in a language like English, but can-
not be used to model how the parser checks for congruency in coreference dependency 
formation, what purpose do they serve? I will not argue for or against English having for-
mal grammatical features for gender, but rather that such features are irrelevant during 
coreference dependency formation. Instead, English and languages with similar gender 
systems rely on conceptual gender for evaluating gender congruency in real time. In order 
to describe how such a system operates, a three-tiered scheme of linguistically and cogni-
tively encoding gender is posited below.
Figure 1: A schema depicting the three proposed tiers, overlaid.
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The three tiers comprise an exemplar tier, a category tier, and a feature tier (Figure 1). 
These tiers are not meant to represent actual processing mechanisms or structures in the 
mind. Rather, they are abstract categories of processes or representations that can be used 
to map behaviors and empirical observations to theoretical properties of grammars and 
other mental mechanisms and modules. Thus, each tier is designed to be as theory-agnostic 
as possible to provide the most utility across the various popular frameworks.
The first tier, the exemplar tier, is represented by a strongly bimodal continuum indica-
tive of how biosocial gender and conceptual gender can vary within a population. Although 
only color and height vary in this diagram, one may imagine that this tier has many more 
dimensions that could align with variation in gender role, gender expression, and overt 
biosocial properties. The second tier, the category tier, comprises two discrete, non-over-
lapping spaces overlaid on the exemplar tier. These categorically distinct spaces represent 
the binary genders as might be conceptualized by someone from a society that reinforces 
a strictly binary gender schema. However, even so, one might not be able to categorize all 
individuals into one of these spaces, so the gap between the categories allows for ambigu-
ous, nonconforming, and ‘other’ instances to exist outside the binary. If the exemplar tier 
is, indeed, multidimensional beyond what can be represented on paper, I request that 
the reader accept that these two categories are not as simple as the rectangles depicted, 
and their apparent shapes simply due to the limitations of the medium. For instance, if 
one dimension encodes hair length as a gendered property of appearance, then a man 
who otherwise fits all other stereotypically masculine traits but has long hair would align 
predominantly but not completely with the category tier’s binary (masculine) category. 
Finally, the third tier is the feature tier which, unlike the previous two, comprises labels 
associated with spaces rather than spaces themselves. In this illustration, the labels are the 
grammatical features <fem> and <masc>, corresponding to a language that has two 
noun classes. A language with more noun classes (or fewer) would have a different con-
figuration for the labels.
4.1.1 The exemplar tier
The exemplar tier consists of observations from individual’s exposure to the variety of observ-
able gender expression. This may include tokens of phenotypic variation, non-conformity 
of gender expression, and variation of cultural norms. Crucially, most individuals will be 
primarily exposed to other individuals who have unambiguous binary gender expression 
and thus will have distinctly bimodal input represented in this tier (Fagot & Leinbach 1993; 
Glen & Hurrell 2012). Individuals who are members of or adjacent to non-conforming or 
nonbinary communities may have a different distribution of input, especially if exposure 
occurs during early acquisition of gender categories.
It cannot be that this tier includes the perceiver’s categorization of the gender of the 
person which they interact with, because that requires a secondary (categorical) behav-
iour that is crucially not a component of this tier. Instead, the tokens in this tier might be 
conceptualized as matrices of perceived properties that are used downstream to categorize 
the gender of the individual. For example, hair length and style, face shape, pitch range of 
voice, clothing style, sociolinguistically marked properties of speech, etc, could be dimen-
sions of each token. These properties can be used to categorize an individual’s gender 
(Fagot & Leinbach 1993; Bussey & Bandura 1999; Armann & Bülthoff 2012; Fausto-Sterling 
2012; Ansara & Hegarty 2013; Zimman 2017), but are not inherently properties of biosocial 
genders. Furthermore, few of these properties are purely linguistic, so the parser will not 
interact with the information stored in this tier. It therefore represents a way of organizing 
general perceptual input about individuals who a person encounters and interacts with 
throughout the lifespan.
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4.1.2 The category tier
The category tier consists of categories that are established through cognitive processes 
relying on bottom-up input from the exemplar tier and top-down information from seman-
tics (e.g., gender schema; Bem 1981; Fagot & Leinbach 1993; Bussey & Bandura 1999; 
O’Brien et al. 2000; Zosuls et al. 2009). The categories of gender encoded in this tier may 
shift if the distribution of input to the exemplar tier changes. As an individual accumu-
lates more exemplars over the lifespan, each new token will comprise a smaller propor-
tion of the total input, thus will have less influence on the shape of the category tier.10 The 
way someone sorts individuals into gender categories should take into account a subset of 
the dimensions catalogued in the exemplar tier. Whichever way an individual categorizes 
people into genders and whatever information is used to make those determinations, the 
category tier holds coarse-grained information about the parameters of each gender cate-
gory. The structure and robustness of this tier relies on the assumption that gender is most 
frequently perceived categorically (Fagot & Leinbach 1993; Armann & Bülthoff 2012).
For example, this could manifest as recognition of variance in feminine gender expression 
and what it means to “self-identify” as having a particular gender (e.g., Zimman 2017). 
However, humans are still readily able to categorize people based on indices canonically 
associated with binary gender expressions into categories (leaving aside the accuracy or 
relevance of these categories) (Bussey & Bandura 1999; Waxman 2010). This suggests 
that the categorical perception of gender is complex and culturally specific. The details of 
this perceptual categorization process are beyond the scope of this paper. What remains 
relevant is that the boundaries of these categories may slightly differ between individu-
als within a culture or society. Thus the boundaries may differ more between individuals 
belonging to different cultures or societies.
These categories are not strictly linguistic, but contribute to assessments of whether lin-
guistic meanings are consistent or felicitous when concerning the gender of referents. For 
instance, when discussing a known person (who is, say, categorized by both interlocutors 
as female), it may be relevant for the comprehension mechanism to refer to the category 
when assessing the plausibility of statements (Kreiner, Sturt & Garrod 2008; Prasad, Morris 
& Feinstein 2018).
(10) Did that studenti email you heri follow-up questions yet?
Imagine that the person who uttered (10) was a guest lecturer and doesn’t know the 
referenced student personally. The guest lecturer told the student to email the regular 
lecturer with any questions and those questions would be forwarded on. Then, when the 
guest lecturer approaches the regular lecturer to ask about the status of the awaited email, 
the gender of the student is assumed based on visual and perhaps auditory cues. In this 
type of situation, the gender of the student may also be important for communicative 
efficiency if it potentially disambiguates the referent (Newman 1992; Foraker & McElree 
2007). However, in English, specifying the student’s perceived (i.e., conceptual) gender is 
always optional, and the choice to include or omit it can be influenced by various social 
and pragmatic reasons.
The interaction of the exemplar tier and the category tier may generate and assign prob-
abilities of genderedness to gender-biased (or equi-biased) lexical items, including names. 
In being exposed to instances of surgeons or Michaels, the tokens that have surgeon or the 
 10 A reviewer points out that it not be the total cumulative number of tokens that shapes the category tier, but 
rather more marked, recent or salient tokens might be more heavily weighted in terms of their influence. 
This seems quite plausible and could potentially be investigated through experimental means, but I will 
leave this to future works.
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name Michael as a property fall predominantly into the male category. If this is the mecha-
nism for generating gender stereotyping, then the stereotype would be accessed in one of 
several ways (that all have the same consequence): An aggregate of all surgeon/Michael 
tokens is assessed as a probability; an individual token of surgeon or Michael is evaluated 
for gender category (thus drawn at random from all tokens of surgeon/Michael); or the 
evaluation of gender is assessed at an earlier time and is a property that is rarely updated 
in the lexicon, independent of the content and structure of the exemplar and category 
tiers. Crucially, whatever the process for determining gender bias associated with a  lexical 
item, its meaning, or gender plausibility, this information is stored separately from the 
grammatical information stored in the feature tier.
Speculatively, if an individual were to have a substantial proportion of their lifetime 
experiences involving nonbinary people, we could assume that the distribution of their 
personal exemplar tier would not be so bimodal as depicted in Figure 1. This might make 
the shapes of the category tier more complex, or possibly create discontinuous categories, 
categories with fuzzy boundaries and other categories besides those designating the mas-
culine and feminine modes of the exemplar tier.
4.1.3 The feature tier
The feature tier consists of discrete φ-features or labels which may include <feminine> and 
<masculine>, among others. These labels can be mapped one-to-one onto the conceptual 
categories in the category tier, but need not be. During coreference resolution, whether or 
not the feature tier is used to determine gender congruency is graded from languages that 
rigidly rely on the feature tier for coreference evaluation to languages without grammatical 
gender that do not map separate (grammatical) labels onto human gender categories (see 
examples in Corbett 2015).
This tier differs from the category tier in that the φ-features are strictly linguistic and are 
formally encoded in the grammar of a language. That is, where the category tier concerns 
categorization of people and animate gendered referents based on social/cultural norms, 
the feature tier does not categorize anything: it consists of linguistic labels that are used 
in purely grammatical operations like agreement. These labels do not need to correspond 
to human gender (e.g., Bantu noun class systems, etc.), and can apply to inanimate lexical 
items. Furthermore, they do not apply to the referents of the relevant lexical items, but to 
the lexical items (antecedents) themselves. For instance, languages that have strict gen-
der agreement will ignore the conceptual gender of the referents (category tier) in using 
grammatical gender to satisfy agreement relations (feature tier). This is elaborated on in 
Section 4.2.
These tiers are three levels at which the parser could assess gender congruency during 
coreference resolution. Once a pronoun is linked to a candidate antecedent, the parser 
may access one of the tiers to check gender congruency (Sturt 2003). If the feature tier 
does not supply relevant formal features for both lexical items (e.g., if it supplies gender 
φ-features for pronouns but not unisex names or gender-stereotyped nouns in English, cf. 
Bjorkman 2017), it cannot compare like to like and an identity relationship will not be 
established. In this case, using the category tier as a holistic congruency assessment would 
be preferable because, presumably, any referring expression will be located in a category 
that can provide a property to be assessed against. Speculatively, if the exemplar tier were 
to have a third mode (e.g., a nonbinary human gender), this might affect the structure 
of the other tiers and provide organic support for the genesis of novel personal pronouns 
(e.g., Centauri 2013). That is, the space depicted between the two categories is present to 
suggest that ambiguous or distinctly nonbinary tokens in the exemplar tier can be accom-
modated by this model. The presence or increased prominence of these sorts of tokens may 
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lead the structure of the categories to adapt and develop a new categorical space, which 
may then provide a distinct space for a novel (grammatical gender) label to designate.
4.2 Typological evidence
Together, these tiers describe three levels of encoding of gender, broadly construed, that a 
language (or an individual) may draw upon in order to determine the gender congruency 
of a pronoun and candidate antecedent during real-time coreference resolution. In (11), I 
describe three possible configurations of languages based on the broad criterion and the 
three tiers of mental representation of gender. These three configurations are points within 
a hierarchy of how rigidly a language (or individual) adheres to matching the gender 
encoded on the feature tier to assess gender congruency. While I list languages as examples 
of these points in the hierarchy, I also suggest that individuals may vary within what an 
individual language permits. That is, a speaker of French who finds any mixed agreement 
to be unacceptable would be applying the description of a Strict feature rather than where 
I have categorized French on the whole (Mixed feature). Similarly, English speakers who 
find singular they difficult to learn or use may be employing more of the ‘mixed’ match-
ing strategy than ‘absent’. Furthermore, English speakers who do use the ‘absent’ strategy 
may also vary in the shape and adaptability of their category tiers, thus introducing intra-
language variation in acceptability.
(11) Strict matching strategy: Languages with no exception to grammatical gender 
agreement which access only the feature tier during coreference resolution. (e.g., 
Tsez, possibly German)
Mixed matching strategy: Languages with grammatical gender (to any extent) will 
start with the feature tier, but draw on the category tier in certain specific contexts, 
such as when the feature tier is incongruent with referent’s conceptual gender. (e.g., 
Russian, possibly French)
Absent matching strategy: Languages without grammatical gender do not have 
labels in the feature tier to be checked, so they must make use of the category tier 
where gender plausibility and discourse context is concerned. (e.g., Turkish, possibly 
English)
Tsez exemplifies a strict matching strategy, with (2) demonstrating a rigid grammati-
cal gender system for anthropomorphic animals and other noun phrases (Comrie 2005; 
 Corbett 2015). Thus, no matter what the conceptual genders of the characters in the 
story are, the agreement is consistent with the morphosyntactic features of the lexical 
items. This may also be the case for some speakers of French for whom maire is necessar-
ily <masc> and mairesse (mayor<fem>) is a viable alternative. While I am being careful 
to avoid a neo-Whorfian claim that language shapes or limits our thought, I think it is 
reasonable to posit that the categories present in one language and not in another could 
draw attention to different non-linguistic properties of the members of those categories, 
thus creating subtle distinctions in the boundaries and shape of the categories. In this 
way, we might explain how grammatical gender can limit conceptual gender in practical 
translation without necessarily claiming that German speakers think toads are necessarily 
feminine (Konishi 1993; Irmen & Kurovskaja 2010). Languages with intermediate strate-
gies like French and Russian would then show some mixed properties wherein formal fea-
tures are checked during coreference resolution, but may be overridden given contextually 
appropriate information (Asarina 2009; 2011). Moreover, languages without grammatical 
gender would then rely entirely on the conceptual categorization of the antecedent to 
evaluate coreference feasibility.
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(12) Agreement patterns in Russian where vrach (m) refers to a woman 
(% = marked in certain registers) (Asarina 2009)
a. Umnaja vrach prishla
smart.f doctor(I) came.f
b. %Umnyj vrach prishel
smart.m doctor(I) came.m
c. %Umnyj vrach prishla
smart.m doctor(I) came.f
d. *Umnaja vrach prishel
smart.f doctor(I) came.m
‘The smart (female) doctor has come.’
Where does English fit into this hierarchy? As it has been claimed that English no longer 
has grammatical gender (except, possibly on pronouns) (Baron 1971), it might be an absent 
feature language. However, Bjorkman (2017) suggests that English does have limited use 
of grammatical gender agreement, particularly when referring to named individuals. If so, 
we might expect such cases to elicit psycholinguistic/cognitive behaviors that are similar 
to those observed in languages that make use of the feature tier. However, testing this 
is made difficult by the limited circumstances in which English could have grammatical 
gender. The potential environments for detecting grammatical gender in English overlap 
with environments where conceptual gender (as determined by the category tier) could 
be an alternative source for checking during coreference resolution. That is, words that 
could have formal gender features (as Bjorkman suggests, personal names) should also 
typically receive a gender property from the cognitive gender of the referent, encoded in 
the category tier.
5 Future directions and conclusions
There are myriad ways to test the hypotheses described in this paper. It is my hope that 
readers will be inspired to use this as a starting point for investigating this relatively 
new line of research into the links between cognition of gender (as a gradient, nonbinary 
property) and how gender is encoded linguistically. If definitionally gendered nouns or 
personal names have formal grammatical gender in English, then there should be a fail-
ure in coreference resolution for the link between cowgirl<fem> and his<masc> in (1)/(7), or 
Johnathan<masc> and their<0> in (3). At this stage of processing, the parser may need to 
draw upon the category tier (rather than feature tier, as it may have originally attempted). 
This could presumably cause a processing slowdown or electrophysiological effect compa-
rable to one that might be observed for a plausibility mismatch.
Since the anaphor in (1)/(7) is also definitionally masculine/male, in conjunction with 
the pragmatic context (a Halloween party, in which costumes allow people some flexibil-
ity in identity performance), the parser may reassign the gender of the lexical item cowgirl 
in a process similar to that of impostor anaphora (Collins & Postal 2012). This should be 
detectable in behavioral and psychophysiological measures (e.g., Kuperberg et al. 2003; 
Nieuwland & Van Berkum 2006; Canal, Garnham & Oakhill 2015). However, the tiered 
schema I propose predicts that individuals who have extensive exposure to third genders 
or gender nonconforming communities will have differently shaped exemplar distribu-
tions, thus also differently shaped category tiers. If the category tier is shaped in such a 
way that the boundaries between gender categories are overlapping or ‘fuzzy’, this may 
ease the processing cost of reanalysis.
The three types of gender distinguished in this proposal comprise a model for exposure to 
variance in gender expression, cognition, and linguistic encoding. The model is designed to 
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be broadly applicable and testable across interfaces of linguistic, cognitive, psychological 
and sociological work. I describe some applications of the model to psycholinguistic top-
ics and suggest future directions for development. Since forays into research on nonbinary 
gender are few and recent, the three-tiered model is intended to lead to better informed 
hypotheses about individual variation related to gender, language processing, and expe-
rience. Moreover, nonbinary people often suffer social stigma for their gender identities 
(McLemore 2015; K. Johnson et al. 2019). This puts empirical studies touching on non-
binary issues in a position to set the standard for ethical and compassionate research on 
and in conjunction with nonbinary people. This paper provides a set of terminology and 
the beginnings of a framework from which formal, empirical, and experimental linguistic 
research on nonbinary issues can grow, while incorporating the varied experiences of the 
people directly affected by it.
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